Monday, June 14, 2021

ഹര്‍ഷദ്‌മേത്തയുടെ പുനരവതാരം

ഇരുപതു വര്‍ഷം മുമ്പാണ് ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്ത എന്ന തട്ടിപ്പുവീരന്‍ മുന്‍ പ്രധാനമന്ത്രി  നരസിംഹറാവുവിന് ഒരുകോടി രൂപ കൈക്കൂലി കൊടുത്തുവെന്ന ആരോപണത്തിലൂടെ രാജ്യത്തെ ഞെട്ടിച്ചത്. ആഗോളീകരണ കാലഘട്ടത്തിലെ ആദ്യത്തെ സ്റ്റോക്ക് എക്‌സ്ചേഞ്ച് തട്ടിപ്പായിരുന്നു ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്തയുടേത്. ഉദാരവത്കരണം സൃഷ്ടിക്കുന്ന പഴുതുകള്‍ എങ്ങനെ കൊളളയ്ക്കുപയോഗപ്പെടുത്താം എന്ന് പ്രായോഗികമായി ചെയ്തു കാണിച്ചത് ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്തയാണ്. 1991ല്‍ ഇന്ത്യന്‍ സ്റ്റോക്ക് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ച് ഉണര്‍ന്നു. ഷെയറുകളുടെ വിലകള്‍ ഉയരാന്‍ തുടങ്ങി. പുതിയ നയങ്ങളുടെ വിജയഭേരിയായി ദലാല്‍ സ്ട്രീറ്റിലെ ആരവം വ്യാഖ്യാനിക്കപ്പെട്ടു. ഷെയറിന്റെ വിലകള്‍ ഇപ്രകാരം കുത്തനെ ഉയരുന്നതിന്റെ പിന്നില്‍ ഷെയറുകള്‍ മൊത്തത്തില്‍ വാങ്ങിക്കൂട്ടുന്ന ആരെങ്കിലും ഉണ്ടാകണം. അന്വേഷണം ചെന്നെത്തിയത് ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്തയിലാണ്. ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്ത ഷെയര്‍ മാര്‍ക്കറ്റിലിറങ്ങിയാല്‍ വിലകള്‍ ഉയരുമായിരുന്നു. വിലകള്‍ ഉയരുമ്പോള്‍ താന്‍ വാങ്ങിയ ഷെയറുകള്‍ വിറ്റ് മേത്ത കാശുണ്ടാക്കി. ഓഹരിക്കമ്പോളത്തെയാകെ സ്വാധീനിക്കത്തക്ക രീതിയില്‍ ഇത്രയേറെ പണമെങ്ങനെ ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്തയുടെ കൈയില്‍ വന്നു എന്ന് അപ്പോഴൊന്നും ആരും ചിന്തിച്ചില്ല. ബിഗ് ബുള്‍ അഥവാ കാളക്കൂറ്റന്‍ എന്നപേരില്‍ ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്ത ആദരിക്കപ്പെട്ടു.


സര്‍ക്കാര്‍ സെക്യൂരിറ്റികളുടെ മാര്‍ക്കറ്റ്

ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്ത തനിക്കു വേണ്ടുന്ന ഭീമാകാരന്‍ തുകകള്‍ സമാഹരിച്ചത് ബാങ്കുകളില്‍ നിന്നായിരുന്നു. ഒരു ഈടും കൊടുക്കാതെ തന്നെ. ഇതിനായി മേത്ത ഉപയോഗപ്പെടുത്തിയത് റിപ്പോ മാര്‍ക്കറ്റിനെയാണ്. വെറുതേ കാശായി പണം സൂക്ഷിച്ചാല്‍ ബാങ്കുകള്‍ക്ക് പലിശ ലഭിക്കുകയില്ലല്ലോ. അതുകൊണ്ട് അത്യാവശ്യനപ്പുറം കൈയില്‍ കാശുണ്ടെന്നു കണ്ടാല്‍ അവ സര്‍ക്കാര്‍ സെക്യൂരിറ്റികളില്‍ നിക്ഷേപിക്കും. പലിശ ചെറുതായിരിക്കുമെങ്കിലും എപ്പോള്‍ വേണമെങ്കിലും ഈ സെക്യൂരിറ്റികള്‍ വിറ്റു കാശാക്കാം എന്ന സൗകര്യവുമുണ്ട്. ഇതിനു പുറമെ എല്ലാ ബാങ്കുകളും ഡെപ്പോസിറ്റിന്റെ ഒരു നിശ്ചിതശതമാനം കേന്ദ്രസര്‍ക്കാരിന്റെ സെക്യൂരിറ്റികളില്‍ നിക്ഷേപിക്കണമെന്ന് നിയമമുണ്ട്. ഡെപ്പോസിറ്റു തുകയില്‍ വരുന്ന മാറ്റമനുസരിച്ച് സെക്യൂരിറ്റികള്‍ വാങ്ങുകയും വില്‍ക്കുകയും വേണം. വിവിധ ബാങ്കുകള്‍ തമ്മില്‍ നിരന്തരം നടക്കുന്ന ഈ ഇടപാടുകള്‍ റിസര്‍വ് ബാങ്ക് പരിശോധിക്കുകയും സെക്യൂരിറ്റികളുടെ ഉടമസ്ഥതകളില്‍ രേഖാമൂലം മാറ്റം വരുത്തുകയും ചെയ്യും.

വിവിധ ബാങ്കുകള്‍ സെക്യൂരിറ്റികള്‍ വാങ്ങുകയും വില്‍ക്കുകയും ചെയ്യുന്നത് ബ്രോക്കര്‍മാര്‍ വഴിയാണ്. ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്തയും ബ്രോക്കറായിരുന്നു. റിസര്‍വ് ബാങ്കിന്റെ രേഖകളില്‍ സെക്യൂരിറ്റി ഉടമസ്ഥാവകാശം മാറ്റിയെഴുതുന്നതിന് ആഴ്ചകളുടെ കാലതാമസമുണ്ടാകുമെന്ന് അയാള്‍ക്കറിയാമായിരുന്നു. അതിനിടയില്‍ ബാങ്ക് വാങ്ങിയ സെക്യൂരിറ്റികള്‍ ഹാജരാക്കിയില്ലെങ്കിലും പ്രശ്‌നമില്ല. ഈ പഴുതുപയോഗപ്പെടുത്തി സെക്യൂരിറ്റി ഇല്ലാതെതന്നെ ബാങ്കുകളില്‍ നിന്ന് വലിയതോതില്‍ പണമെടുക്കുകയും ഷെയര്‍ മാര്‍ക്കറ്റില്‍ നിക്ഷേപിക്കുകയുമായിരുന്നു മേത്തയുടെ അടവ്. സെക്യൂരിറ്റികളുടെ വാങ്ങലും വില്‍പ്പനയും നിരന്തരം നടക്കുന്നതുകൊണ്ട് അപകടമൊന്നുമില്ലാതെ പണം റോള്‍ ചെയ്തുപോകാനും കഴിഞ്ഞു. ഇങ്ങനെ ഏതാണ്ട് 3500 കോടി രൂപയുടെ ബാങ്കു പണമാണ് മേത്തയെടുത്ത് ഓഹരിക്കമ്പോളത്തില്‍ കളിച്ചത്. കളി പാളി. എസ്ബിഐയുടെ അക്കൗണ്ടില്‍ പണം തിരിച്ചെത്തിയില്ല. അതോടെ കോലാഹലമായി. ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്ത അറസ്റ്റിലുമായി. താനെ ജയിലില്‍ കിടന്ന് ഈ സ്റ്റോക്ക് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ച് മാന്ത്രികന്‍ കാലയവനികയില്‍ മറയുകയും ചെയ്തു.

അധികവായനയ്ക്കു താല്‍പര്യമുളളവര്‍ ദേബാഷിഷ് ബസുവും സുചേതാ ദലാലും ചേര്‍ന്നെഴുതിയ ദി സ്‌കാം (തട്ടിപ്പ്) എന്ന ഗ്രന്ഥം വായിക്കുക. ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്തയെക്കുറിച്ചു മാത്രമല്ല, പത്തുവര്‍ഷം കഴിഞ്ഞ് കേതന്‍ പരേഖ് നടത്തിയ മറ്റൊരു ഭീമന്‍ ഓഹരിത്തട്ടിപ്പിന്റെയും വിശദമായ കഥ ഇതിലുണ്ട്. കേതന്‍ പരേഖ് തട്ടിപ്പിന് ഒരു ദശാബ്ദം പിന്നിടുമ്പോഴാണ് ജിഗ്നേഷ് ഷായുടെ നാഷണല്‍ സ്‌പോട്ട് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ച് തട്ടിപ്പ് ഇപ്പോള്‍ വന്നിരിക്കുന്നത്.  എല്ലാ പത്തുവര്‍ഷം കൂടുമ്പോഴും ഒരു ഭീമന്‍ ഓഹരിക്കുംഭകോണം ഇന്ത്യയെ പിടിച്ചുകുലുക്കിക്കൊണ്ടിരിക്കുകയാണ്. ഓരോ കുംഭകോണവും അന്വേഷണ റിപ്പോര്‍ട്ടുകളും - ഹര്‍ഷദ്‌മേത്തയുടെ കാര്യത്തിലാണെങ്കില്‍ പാര്‍ലമെന്ററി സമിതിയുടെ റിപ്പോര്‍ട്ടു തന്നെയുണ്ട് - പോലീസ് നടപടികളും ഉണ്ടാകും. എല്ലാവരും കുറച്ചു ജാഗ്രത പുലര്‍ത്തും. കുറേക്കഴിയുമ്പോള്‍ എല്ലാം തഥൈവ. ഊഹക്കച്ചവടവും തട്ടിപ്പും തമ്മില്‍ വലിയ അകലമില്ല എന്നതാണ് സത്യം.

നാഷണല്‍ സ്‌പോട്ട് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ച് എന്ത്?

നാഷണല്‍ സ്‌പോട്ട് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ച് ലിമിറ്റഡ് (National Spot Exchange) അഥവാ എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്‍ (NSEL) ഓഹരിക്കമ്പോളമല്ല. ചരക്കുകള്‍ കൈമാറുന്നതിനുളള ദേശീയ കമ്പോളമാണ്. 'അപകടരഹിതവും തടസരഹിതവുമായി രാജ്യത്തുടനീളമുളള വിവിധ ചരക്കുകള്‍ വാങ്ങാനും വില്‍ക്കാനുമുളള അത്യാധുനിക സാങ്കേതികത കൈവരിച്ച സംഘടിതവും നിയതവുമായ വിതരണ മാര്‍ക്കറ്റ്' എന്നാണ് അവര്‍ സ്വയം വിശേഷിപ്പിക്കുന്നത്. നമ്മുടെ നാട്ടിലെ ചരക്കുകമ്പോളങ്ങളുടെ ദേശീയതലത്തിലുളള ഇലക്‌ട്രോണിക്‌സ് രൂപമാണ് ഇതെന്നു പറയാം. നാഷണല്‍ കോഓപ്പറേറ്റീവ് മാര്‍ക്കറ്റിംഗ് ഫെഡറേഷനും ഫിനാന്‍ഷ്യല്‍ ടെക്‌നോളജീസ് ലിമിറ്റഡ് എന്ന സ്വകാര്യസ്ഥാപനവും സംയുക്തമായാണ് ഇതാരംഭിച്ചത്. കേന്ദ്രസര്‍ക്കാരിന്റെ അകമഴിഞ്ഞ പിന്തുണയും ഈ സംരംഭത്തിനുണ്ടായിരുന്നു.

കാര്‍ഷികമോ ഖനിജങ്ങളോ ആയ പ്രാഥമിക ചരക്കുകള്‍ വില്‍ക്കുന്ന ഭീമന്‍ കമ്പോളങ്ങള്‍ ഇന്ത്യയിലെ പലഭാഗത്തുമുണ്ട്. ഇവിടങ്ങളിലേയ്ക്ക് ചരക്കുകള്‍ ചെറുകിട ഉല്‍പാദകരില്‍നിന്നു വാങ്ങി മൊത്തക്കച്ചവടക്കാര്‍ കൊണ്ടുവരുന്നു. വ്യവസായികളും കയറ്റുമതിക്കാരും മറ്റും ഇവരില്‍ നിന്ന് കാശുകൊടുത്ത് ചരക്കുകള്‍ വാങ്ങും. ശ്രദ്ധിക്കേണ്ടുന്ന കാര്യം റെഡി കാഷ് അല്ലെങ്കില്‍ അതിന്റെ ഉറപ്പുനല്‍കുന്നു. അപ്പോള്‍ത്തന്നെ ചരക്കും യഥാര്‍ത്ഥത്തില്‍ത്തന്നെ കൈമാറുന്നു.

ഇതിനുപകരം മൊത്തക്കച്ചവടക്കാര്‍ക്ക് അല്ലെങ്കില്‍ സപ്ലെയേഴ്‌സിന് തങ്ങളുടെ ചരക്കുകള്‍ അംഗീകൃത വെയര്‍ഹൗസില്‍ കൊണ്ടുവന്നു സൂക്ഷിച്ചാല്‍മതി. ഇതിന്റെ രസീത് ഇന്റര്‍നെറ്റു വഴി വില്‍പനയ്ക്കു വരുന്നു. വാങ്ങുന്ന സ്ഥാപനത്തിനോ വ്യക്തിയ്‌ക്കോ ഇന്ത്യയിലെവിടെയിരുന്നു വേണമെങ്കിലും ഈ രസീതു വാങ്ങാം. ഇതോടെ വെയര്‍ഹൗസില്‍ സൂക്ഷിക്കുന്ന ചരക്ക് അയാളുടെ വകയായി. ഇത്തരത്തില്‍ രൊക്കമായി ചരക്കുകള്‍ ഇലക്‌ട്രോണിക് സംവിധാനം വഴി വാങ്ങുകയും വില്‍ക്കുകയും ചെയ്യുന്ന കമ്പോളമാണ് എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്‍. ഇതിന്റെ നേട്ടം ഉല്‍പാദകര്‍ക്കു ലഭിക്കും എന്നാണ് വെപ്പ്. വണ്ടന്‍മേട് വെയര്‍ഹൗസില്‍ കൊണ്ടുവെയ്ക്കുന്ന ഏലത്തിന്റെ ലേലം വിളിയില്‍ പങ്കുകൊളളാന്‍ കയറ്റുമതിക്കാരോ വ്യവസായികളോ വണ്ടന്‍മേട്ടില്‍ വരേണ്ട. ഇന്ത്യയില്‍ എവിടെനിന്നു വേണമെങ്കിലും വാങ്ങാം. ലേലം വിളിയിലെ ഒത്തുകളിയും ഉണ്ടാവുകയില്ല. ഈ കാരണം പറഞ്ഞ് കേരള കര്‍ഷക രക്ഷയ്ക്കു വേണ്ടി കേരളത്തിലേയ്ക്ക് എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്ലിനെ ആഘോഷപൂര്‍വം കൊണ്ടുവന്നതിന്റെ ക്രെഡിറ്റ് കേന്ദ്രമന്ത്രി കെ. വി. തോമസിനാണ്. എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്ലില്‍ അംഗത്വമെടുക്കുന്നതിന് വെസ്റ്റേണ്‍ ഗാട്ട്‌സ് ആഗ്രോ ഗ്രോവേഴ്‌സ് ലിമിറ്റഡ് എന്ന കമ്പനിയും ഉണ്ടാക്കി.

ഹര്‍ഷദ് മേത്ത നടത്തിയതിനെക്കാള്‍ വമ്പന്‍ കൊളളയാണ് ജിഗ്നേഷ് ഷായും കൂട്ടരും എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്‍. ഉപയോഗിച്ചു നടത്തിയിട്ടുളളത്. എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്‍ അടച്ചുപൂട്ടപ്പെട്ടു. 5600 കോടി രൂപ എവിടെപ്പോയെന്ന് ആര്‍ക്കും അറിയില്ല. കേരളത്തില്‍ സരിതതട്ടിപ്പുകൊണ്ട് മാധ്യമങ്ങള്‍ നിറഞ്ഞില്ലായിരുന്നെങ്കില്‍ ഒരുപക്ഷേ, ഇതായിരുന്നേനെ മുഖ്യവാര്‍ത്ത. ദേശീയാടിസ്ഥാനത്തില്‍ രൂപയുടെ മൂല്യം ഇടിവ് നിറഞ്ഞതും ചരക്കുകമ്പോളത്തിലെ ഈ ഭൂകമ്പം തമസ്‌കരിക്കപ്പെടുന്നതിന് ഇടയാക്കി.

രൊക്കം വില്‍പനയ്ക്കു പകരം ഊഹക്കച്ചവടം

സ്‌പോട്ട് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ച് എന്ന പേരുതന്നെ രൊക്കം ഇടപാടുകളാണ് ഈ എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ചിന്റെ സ്വഭാവം എന്നു വ്യക്തമാക്കുന്നുണ്ട്. പണം കൊടുക്കുക, സാധനം കൈമാറുക. ഈ വില്‍ക്കല്‍ - വാങ്ങല്‍ ഇലക്‌ട്രോണിക് സംവിധാനത്തിലൂടെയാണെന്നു മാത്രം. വില്‍പന നടന്നാല്‍ രണ്ടാം പക്കം പണം കൊടുക്കണം. ഇതിനെയാണ് ടി + 2 എന്നു വിളിക്കുന്നത്. ടി എന്നാല്‍ ട്രേഡ് അല്ലെങ്കില്‍ വില്‍പന. വില്‍പന നടന്നാല്‍ രണ്ടാംദിനം പണമൊടുക്കണം. പത്തുദിവസത്തിനു ശേഷമാണു പണം നല്‍കുന്നതെങ്കില്‍ ഇതിനെ അവധിക്കച്ചവടം (Forward Marketing) എന്നാണു വിളിക്കുക. ഇത്തരം വ്യാപാരം നടത്തുന്നതിനുളള അധികാരം സ്‌പോട്ട് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ചിനില്ല. എന്നാല്‍ എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്‍ ടി + 25 (വ്യാപാരം കഴിഞ്ഞ് 25-ാം ദിവസം പണം), ടി + 35 (വ്യാപാരം കഴിഞ്ഞ് 35-ാം ദിവസം പണം)  ഇങ്ങനെയുളള ഇടപാടുകളും നിയമവിരുദ്ധമായി ആരംഭിച്ചു.

ഇതിനവര്‍ സ്വീകരിച്ച ഉപായം ഇതായിരുന്നു; ടി + 2 വില്‍പനയോടൊപ്പം ടി + 25 അല്ലെങ്കില്‍ ടി + 35 മറുവില്‍പന കൂടി അനുവദിക്കുക. ഈ ഇടപാട് കുറച്ചുകൂടി വിശദീകരിക്കാം. ലുധിയാനയിലെ എആര്‍കെ കമ്പനിയാണ് ഇന്ത്യയിലെ ഏറ്റവും വലിയ കമ്പിളി വില്‍പനക്കാര്‍. കാശ്മീര്‍, പഞ്ചാബ് മേഖലയിലെ കമ്പിളി മാത്രമല്ല, വിദേശത്തു നിന്ന് വലിയതോതില്‍ കമ്പിളി അവര്‍ ഇറക്കുമതി ചെയ്യുകയും ചെയ്യുന്നു. അംഗീകൃത വെയര്‍ഹൗസില്‍ അവര്‍ കമ്പിളി വില്‍പനയ്ക്കു വെയ്ക്കുന്നു. രണ്ടുദിവസത്തെ അവധിയ്ക്കു വില്‍ക്കുന്നു. വാങ്ങുന്നയാള്‍ പണവും നല്‍കുന്നു. പക്ഷേ, അതേസമയം തന്നെ 25 ദിവസത്തെ അവധിയ്ക്ക് ഇതേ കമ്പിളി വിലയല്‍പ്പം വര്‍ദ്ധിപ്പിച്ച് തിരിച്ചും വില്‍ക്കുന്നു. കമ്പിളി ഗോഡൗണില്‍ നിന്നെങ്ങും പോകുന്നില്ല. 25 ദിവസം കഴിഞ്ഞ് ഏആര്‍കെ പണം നല്‍കിയാല്‍ മതിയാകും. ഉയര്‍ന്ന വില കണക്കാക്കുമ്പോള്‍ 14 - 18 ശതമാനം പലിശ മുടക്കിയ പണത്തിന് ആദ്യം വാങ്ങിയ നിക്ഷേപകനു തിരിച്ചുകിട്ടും. അപ്പോഴേയ്ക്കും വേറൊരു ലോട്ട് കമ്പിളി മറ്റാര്‍ക്കെങ്കിലും വിറ്റിരിക്കും. പതിനായിരക്കണക്കിന് കോടി രൂപയാണ് ഇപ്രകാരം റോള്‍ ചെയ്തുകൊണ്ടിരിക്കുന്നത്.

യഥാര്‍ത്ഥത്തില്‍ നടക്കുന്നത് വാങ്ങലും വില്‍ക്കലും അല്ല. 14 - 18 ശതമാനം പലിശയ്ക്ക് ഏആര്‍കെയ്ക്ക് വന്‍തോതില്‍ വായ്പ ലഭ്യമാവുകയാണ്. ഇത് അവര്‍ സ്വന്തം കച്ചവടത്തില്‍ മുടക്കാം. അതല്ലെങ്കില്‍ റിയല്‍ എസ്റ്റേറ്റുപോലുളള മേഖലകളില്‍ മുടക്കും. പലപ്പോഴും വെയര്‍ഹൗസില്‍ കമ്പിളിയൊന്നും വെയ്ക്കാതെ തന്നെ കമ്പിളി വില്‍ക്കുകയും തിരിച്ചുവാങ്ങുകയും ചെയ്യുന്നു. ഇതിനു പുറമെ മറ്റൊരു നിയമവിരുദ്ധമായ കാര്യം കൂടി സ്‌പോട്ട് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ച് നടത്തി. ഇന്ത്യയിലെ ആകെ കമ്പിളിയുല്‍പാദനം ഏതാണ്ട് 45000 ടണ്ണാണ്. ജൂലൈ മാസത്തില്‍ എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്ലിന്റെ വെയര്‍ഹൗസില്‍ ഏആര്‍കെയുടെ വകയായി മാത്രം ഉണ്ടായിരുന്ന കമ്പിളി 11000 ടണ്‍ വരും. മൊത്തം ഉല്‍പാദനത്തിന്റെ ഏതാണ്ട് നാലിലൊന്ന്. ഇറക്കുമതി കൂടി കണക്കിലെടുത്താലും ഇത്രയും വലിയതോതില്‍ കമ്പിളി വെയര്‍ഹൗസില്‍ സൂക്ഷിക്കുക അസാധ്യമാണ്. യഥാര്‍ത്ഥത്തില്‍ വാങ്ങലും വില്‍ക്കലും നടന്നുകൊണ്ടിരുന്നത് കൈയില്‍ കമ്പിളി ഇല്ലാതെയാണ്. ഇതിനെയാണ് ഷോര്‍ട്ട് സെല്ലിംഗ് എന്നു പറയുന്നത്. ഈ ഊഹക്കച്ചവടമാണ് പലരും നടത്തിക്കൊണ്ടിരുന്നത്.
എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്‍ പൊളിയുന്നു

മന്ത്രി കെ. വി. തോമസിന്റെ ഉപഭോക്തൃ വകുപ്പാണ്  എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്ലിനെ സ്‌പോണ്‍സര്‍ ചെയ്തിരുന്നത്. എന്നാല്‍ അവര്‍ക്ക് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ചിലെ ഇടപാടുകളൊക്കെ നോക്കുന്നതിനുളള സംവിധാനമില്ല. ഇതിന് ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥ സംവിധാനവുമുളളത് ഫോര്‍വേഡ് മാര്‍ക്കറ്റിംഗ് കമ്മിഷനാണ്. എന്നാല്‍ എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്‍ സ്‌പോട്ട് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ച് അവധിക്കച്ചവട സ്ഥാപനമല്ല എന്നു പറഞ്ഞ് ഫോര്‍വേഡ് മാര്‍ക്കറ്റിംഗ് കമ്മിഷന്റെ പരിധിയ്ക്കു പുറത്താണ് പ്രവര്‍ത്തിച്ചത്. ആരുടെയും നിയന്ത്രണത്തിലല്ലാതെ ആയപ്പോള്‍ ഇഷ്ടംപോലെ പണം തിരിമറി ചെയ്യാന്‍ എളുപ്പമായി. കളളക്കളി വ്യക്തമായപ്പോള്‍ ഫോര്‍വേഡ് മാര്‍ക്കറ്റിംഗ് കമ്മിഷന്‍ ഇടപെട്ടു. നിയമവിരുദ്ധ ടി + 25 വില്‍പന നിര്‍ത്തിവെയ്ക്കാന്‍ അവര്‍ ആവശ്യപ്പെട്ടു. പക്ഷേ, നേരത്തെ സൂചിപ്പിച്ചതുപോലെ വെയര്‍ഹൗസില്‍ ചരക്കൊന്നും വെയ്ക്കാതെയാണല്ലോ വില്‍പന നടത്തിക്കൊണ്ടിരുന്നത്. ഇങ്ങനെ സമാഹരിച്ച ഭീമന്‍ തുക റിയല്‍ എസ്റ്റേറ്റിലും മറ്റും മുടക്കിയും കഴിഞ്ഞുപോയി. അതുകൊണ്ട് പണം തിരിച്ചുനല്‍കാന്‍ കൈയിലില്ലാത്ത അവസ്ഥ വന്നു. ഇനി 5600 കോടി രൂപയെങ്കിലും കിട്ടിയാല്‍ മാത്രമേ ഇടപാടുകള്‍ തീര്‍ക്കാന്‍ പറ്റൂ.

ആറു മാസത്തിലേറെയായി ഈ തിരിമറികള്‍ പുറത്തുവന്നിട്ട്. എല്ലാം ഒതുക്കിത്തീര്‍ക്കാനുളള ശ്രമങ്ങളാണ് നടന്നത്. ഇടപാടുകള്‍ തീര്‍ക്കുന്നതിന് മാനേജ്‌മെന്റ് പല അവധികള്‍ പറഞ്ഞു. പക്ഷേ, വാക്കു പാലിക്കാന്‍ കഴിഞ്ഞില്ല. നിക്ഷേപകരും അവരുടെ ബ്രോക്കര്‍മാരും പ്രക്ഷോഭത്തിലായി. അതോടെ സിബിഐ കേസെടുത്തു. ജിഗ്നേഷ് മേത്തയടക്കമുളളവര്‍ അറസ്റ്റിലായി. പക്ഷേ, ചിദംബരം പറഞ്ഞത് ബ്രോക്കര്‍മാരും മറ്റും എല്ലാമറിഞ്ഞുകൊണ്ടാണ് പണം നിക്ഷേപിച്ചത് എന്നാണ്. അതുകൊണ്ട് ബഹളം വെയ്ക്കുന്നതില്‍ അര്‍ത്ഥമില്ല പോലും. ബ്രോക്കര്‍മാര്‍ എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്ലില്‍ നടക്കുന്നതെന്തെന്ന് തിരിച്ചറിയാതിരിക്കാന്‍ ന്യായമില്ല. പക്ഷേ, 14 - 18 ശതമാനം പലിശ ഉറപ്പുതരുന്ന ഒരേര്‍പ്പാടായിട്ടു മാത്രമേ അവരിതിനെ കണ്ടുളളൂ. ഏതാണ്ടൊരു മണി ചെയിന്‍പോലെ.

ഇങ്ങനെ കരുതിയതില്‍ അത്ഭുതമില്ല. സ്‌പോട്ട് എക്‌സ്‌ചേഞ്ചാണെങ്കിലും ഇന്ത്യയില്‍ ആദ്യമായി സ്വര്‍ണം, വെളളി, ഓഹരി എന്നിവ ഡിമാറ്റ് രൂപത്തിലുളള കമ്പോളം ആരംഭിച്ചതിന്റെ ക്രെഡിറ്റും എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്ലിനാണ്. നിക്ഷേപകര്‍ക്ക് ഓഹരി വാങ്ങുന്നതുപോലെ സ്വര്‍ണവും വെളളിയും മറ്റും വാങ്ങുകയും വില്‍ക്കുകയും ചെയ്യാം. നാഷണല്‍ സെക്യൂരിറ്റീസ് ഡെപ്പോസിറ്ററിയിലോ സെന്‍ട്രല്‍ ഡെപ്പോസിറ്ററി സര്‍വീസിലോ ബ്രോക്കര്‍മാരായ ഡെപ്പോസിറ്ററി പാര്‍ട്ടിസിപ്പന്റ്‌സ് വഴി സ്വര്‍ണം വാങ്ങാം. നിക്ഷേപകന്റെ പേരിലേയ്ക്കു സ്വര്‍ണം മാറ്റും. അക്കൗണ്ടില്‍ നിന്നു പണം എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്ലിലേയ്ക്ക് പോവുകയും ചെയ്യും. സ്വര്‍ണം വേണ്ടെങ്കില്‍ അതുവില്‍ക്കുന്നതിനും പ്രയാസമില്ല. പണം അക്കൗണ്ടിലേയ്ക്കു വരും. സ്വര്‍ണം വാങ്ങുന്നത് അതുകൊണ്ട് എന്തെങ്കിലും ആഭരണം ഉണ്ടാക്കി ഉപയോഗിക്കാനല്ല. സ്വര്‍ണത്തിന്റെ വിലയില്‍ വരുന്ന മാറ്റത്തില്‍ നിന്ന് നേട്ടമുണ്ടാക്കാനാണ്. ഇതിന് എന്‍.എസ്.ഇ.എല്‍ നല്‍കിയ പേര് ഇ സീരീസിലെ ഉല്‍പന്നങ്ങള്‍ എന്നാണ്. ചരക്കുകളുടെ സ്‌പോട്ട് രൊക്കവില്‍പനയ്ക്കും സമാന്തരമായി ഇ സീരീസ് കൂടിയുളളപ്പോള്‍ രൊക്കവില്‍പന അവധി വില്‍പനയ്ക്കു വഴിമാറിയതില്‍ അത്ഭുതപ്പെടാനില്ല. എന്നു മാത്രമല്ല, ചരക്കുകള്‍ വെയര്‍ഹൗസില്‍ സൂക്ഷിച്ചിട്ടുവേണം വില്‍പനയെന്നുളള പ്രാഥമിക തത്ത്വം അവഗണിക്കുന്നതിനും പ്രോത്സാഹനമായി.

സ്വര്‍ണത്തിന്റെ മാത്രമല്ല, കാര്‍ഷിക ഉല്‍പന്നങ്ങളുടെയും വിലകളെ നിയന്ത്രിക്കുന്നത് ഇത്തരത്തിലുളള ഊഹക്കച്ചവടക്കാരാണ്. അവരാകട്ടെ, തങ്ങളുടെ കൊളളലാഭത്തിനായി തിരിമറിക്കുളള ഒരവസരവും പാഴാക്കില്ല. ഇവരുടെ കൈയില്‍ കേരളത്തിലെ കൃഷിക്കാരുടെ ഭാവി ഭദ്രമാണെന്നാണ് കെ വി തോമസ് ഉറപ്പുനല്‍കിക്കൊണ്ടിരുന്നത്.

http://archives.chintha.in/index.php/2013-11-15-14-31-07/2013-04-18-15-20-19/164-2013-11-18-08-44-12

Monday, October 5, 2020

Speech At The Forty-second meeting of the GST Council

ON 5th October, 2020 (Video Conference) 

Hon’ble Union Finance Minister Smt. Nirmala Sitaraman Chairperson of the GST Council, my colleague State Finance Ministers, Officers of the Government of India and State Governments.

 1.  Introduction of GST was the culmination of 14-year-long thought process that began in December, 2002 The Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers had played an exemplary role in this process, converging diverse views and evolving a suitable model for GST. One of the main concerns of the states was the revenue loss which may occur when the states subsume their taxing powers, and when the taxation system changes from origin based to destination based.

 2.  The issue of GST compensation was discussed in the Empowered Committee meetings held on 14th June and 26th July, 2016. The States had unanimously agreed that the compensation should be paid in full for a period of five years. This sentiment of the said States was shared with the Union Finance Minister who was appreciative of the concerns of the States and he assured the Empowered Committee that the Centre is committed to give full compensation for a period of five years.

 3.  The states were rightfully concerned about the compensation to be made statutory, in view of their sour experience with VAT compensation.  So, they were assured of compensation by the central government and it was incorporated in the Constitutional amendment bill and further to allay the fears it was mandated that “parliament shall, by law” provide for compensation, instead of “may”. The above facts are evident from the words of then Finance minister while replying to the debate in the Rajya Sabha the Constitutional amendment bill was discussed on3rd August, 2016.

 

So when Mr. Derek says, 'Please clear our dues', he is right. This was the pre-condition with this Act. What was the second problem they had? The second problem they had was: If we lose money, how do you compensate us? The 2011 Bill did not mention anything about the compensation. So, today, in the 2014 Bill, when we suggested that we would pay compensation for five years, so distrustful were the States of the Centre — my original proposal was full compensation for three years, thereafter, one half for one year, one fourth for the fifth year — that the States said, "Nothing doing, give us full compensation for five years." So, instead of the word 'may', — it was, earlier, "The Parliament 'may' by law provide for compensation" – they said, "We don't even trust your 'may', make it 'shall' because your intention in the past had never been to pay; CST was not paid." That is how 'may' has become 'shall'. ...(Interruptions)... It is unprecedented, but, that is how ‘may' became 'shall'.

 

It cannot be denied that compensation package and the comfort it provide to the states was the deal breaker in implementing GST across the country.

 4.  Accordingly, while the compensation law was discussed in the Council, in the first instance only the modalities of payment of compensation were discussed.  Funding of compensation through Cess came up subsequently and the States had agreed to the levy of Cess after prolonged discussions.  During the discussions in the 5th GST Council meeting held on 2nd/3rd December, 2016, the 7th GST Council meeting held on 22nd/23rd December, 2016 and the 8th GST Council meeting held on 3rd/4th January 2017, the relationship between compensation and compensation Cess was extensively discussed. Apart from Kerala, the Ministers from Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Telangana, West Bengal, Assam, Gujarat, Kerala and Karnataka had elaborately raised the point that the obligation to give compensation should not be restricted to the amount of compensation Cess and in case of any shortfall, the shortfall should be made good by the Centre. In response to these discussions, the then Hon'ble Chairperson and Union Finance Minister had given the following assurance: -(emphasis added)"The Hon'ble Chairperson assured that compensation to States shall be paid for 5 years in full within the stipulated period of 5 years…” In short, the late Union Finance Minister had given a firm assurance to the States that the compensation shall be paid in full within the stipulated period of five years. He added that“….in case the amount in the GST Compensation Fund fell short of the compensation payable in any bimonthly period, the GST Council shall decide the mode of raising additional resources including borrowing from the market which could be  paid by collection of cess in the sixth ear or further subsequent years".  States were assured that compensation will not be restricted to the compensation Cess collected.  Section 10(i) of the compensation Act reflects this position.

 5.  Further, in the 10th GST Council Meeting held on 18 February 2017 the following decision was made by the council, the following assurance was given by the Central Government:

 

6.3. The Hon'ble Minister from Telangana stated that the Compensation Law should provide that if money fell short in the Compensation Fund, it could be raised from other sources. The Secretary stated that Section 8(1) of the draft Compensation Law provided that cess could be collected for a period of five years or such period as may be prescribed on the recommendation of the Council. He stated that this implied that the Central Government could raise resources by other means for compensation and this could be then recouped by continuation of cess beyond five years. He stated that the other decisions including the possibility of market borrowing for payment of compensation was part of the Minutes of the s" Meeting of the Council (held on 3rd and 4th January, 2017) and need not be incorporated in the Law. The Council agreed to this suggestion.”

 I had narrated the above to unambiguously lay before you the federal decisions taken in the council through consensus regarding compensation, arrived through a democratic deliberative process.

 6.  Even during this pandemic, one has to contemplate on the reasons of the current compensation imbroglio. It was after much deliberation that the 14 per cent growth was guaranteed to the states. But the optimistic mood regarding the buoyancy of GST prevailing then has not been borne out by the actual outcome even after three years. The implementation has been lackluster, with the IT backbone yet to be completed and tax administration handicapped by too many impediments. Further, the pre-election sharp reductions in tax rates without serious examination of the revenue implications have also contributed to the fall in revenue. The current rates are not revenue neutral.

 7. The widening of the Compensation deficit had become evident much before Covid with the sharp decline in GDP growth rate during 2019-20. So much so, the 37th GST Council meeting at Goa witnessed strange spectacle of the Union Finance Commission Chairman addressing the Council to plead to the states to re-visit the Compensation formula. 14 per cent growth was unsustainable in the macro economic scenario that prevailed in the country. State after state, irrespective of political affiliations, had then rejected the proposal and refused to discuss it. This reflects the true feeling of the Council on the issue. In the 39th GST Council meeting at New Delhi it was assured that a special meeting of the Council would be convened to discuss the Compensation issue that had taken as serious turn after the reference in the budget speech that the compensation would be limited to fund availability in the Cess fund. However the issue was not including the Agenda of the Council that met after the budget.

 8.  The matter of compensation was raised by the states in the 40th GST council meeting where it was decided that views of states on how to resolve the compensation deadlock would be gathered and after assimilating the same the centre would do all the due diligence on the mode with which this can be accomplished, get all the opinion, compile and share with the States. But in the 41st council meeting the states presented their views the centre discussed the opinion Attorney General and placed before the states two options of borrowing. It was also unilaterally decided that the states should opt one within 10days.  This, I believe, has been done in a way with scant regard for democratic deliberations.

 There was no consensus. Once again, may revert to the discussions on the constitutional amendment bill for GST, where the then finance minister while replying to the debate dwelled upon the decision making in the empowered committee and the future decision making in the GST council. He said “GST Council will decide by consensus”. 

 9.  However, the functioning of the GST council in last few years has not lived up to these high principles. In the 41st council meeting no agenda note is circulated and not even the AG’s opinion shared with states before the meeting. The presentations are made and at end of the meeting two options are put before states and states are asked to choose one of them within a week. In default the states are threatened that choosing none of the option would mean no compensation.  In the circumstances if the avowed principle of consensus is not being upheld, the legal provisions for Dispute Resolution Mechanism within council should be activated without delay.

 10.  Now if you see the options the option 1 introduced a new concept  of dividing the revenue losses ‘ on account of implementation of GST”( the phrase used article 19 of the Constitutional Amendment Act)” and “due to the pandemic”. The compensation on account of “due to the pandemic” would be deferred to year 2022 with no clarity on whether interest for two years would be paid. Events like, recessions, pandemics, demonetization etc. where never the considerations when Compensation formula was devised.  The Compensation law clearly defines how Compensation is to be calculated and it has no reference what so ever to any conditions whether it be Act of nature, gods or man. The phrase “on account of implementation of GST” would only mean “the loss of state autonomy in taxation where they are deprived of raising resources on their own”. Secondly the centre also argued with the states that AG had opined that the central government is not legally bound to compensate the states from CFI. The centre also put forward the argument that an opposition member’s amendment to compensate the states from CFI, to the constitutional amendment bill was rejected by Lok Sabha by voting. Given the history of the discussions, the consensus reached by the states and centre regarding compensation bringing up these type of arguments to coerce the states to accept one of the two options, is a lowest point in the centre-state fiscal relations.

 11.  These actions cannot be viewed in isolation.  There is significant erosion of trust. Circumstances point to a situation where the center’s actions are constricting the state resources and its financial autonomy. Since cesses are kept outside the divisible pool, the states being given only 32% of the Centre’s resources against the promised 42%. Another issue relates to incorrect management of IGST and compensation accounts.  The Central Government incorrectly appropriated a sum of Rs. 88,344.22 crores in 2017-18 and Rs 13944  in 2018-19 from IGST account by crediting it to the Consolidated Fund of India. As a result of the continued adoption of the erroneous process of devolution of IGST to states and retention of un-apportioned balance in the CFI instead of first apportioning IGST between the Centre and States/UTs and then devolving States’ share from the amount apportioned to the Centre, States had overall received less funds on account of IGST. This also implies that tax receipts of the GoI were overstated to that extent and the revenue deficit understated during the year. To this extent, there was an artificial revenue shortfall in the States and the Central Government used the Compensation Fund to make good the short fall. This did not give the correct picture of revenue. This wrong practice continued in 18-19 also, inspite of the fact that the error was pointed out by Accountant General. The much-required amendment in the CST Act which restricts industries from purchasing petroleum products at 2% from other states despite constant request by all states irrespective of political affiliation has not materialized. This is causing considerable revenue loss to the states, petroleum products, being one of the independent revenue sources to the states after the implementation of GST. Now, the latest one is where the states, with their limited borrowing capacity are required to bear the full burden of GST compensation loans.  The borrowings of the states were independent of GST Compensation. Now it gets tied to the compensation.

 12.   In the circumstances, I would like to put forward two cardinal principles on compensation which are non-negotiable.

 i.)    There can be no bifurcation of revenue shortfall for compensation purposes as due to pandemic and due to implementation of GST. Entire shortfall needs to be compensated. It is the constitutional right of the states.

ii.) Compensation cannot be linked to Normal borrowing or Additional borrowing limits allowed to states.

 Both the options presented by the central government infringe upon the above two cardinal principles and therefore not acceptable. And we would out right reject all notions that refuse to make the choice will lose their Compensation till 2022. It is true that central government presented the two options before the Council like, we the states also presented our options. The issue continues to be open for a decision of the Council.

 13. Once we accept the two basic principles enunciated in the above para then we can discuss and try to arrive at the consensus regarding the following issues.

 i)                   Who borrows-Centre/ State or in what proportion

ii)     What amount to be borrowed this year and what amount to be deferred to 2022?

iii)                Repayment through extension of the Cess beyond five years.

iv)                Or any other relevant matter.

 

14. While we discuss the above issues and try to reach a consensus, what can be tentatively arrived at, may be implemented as an interim measure. It`s important that at least a part of the Compensation to the states be paid immediately given the shortfall in the revenues of the states and the financial crunch. What we states are demanding is not for support for any additional expenditure but to maintain our budgeted expenditure. It is against of all principles of macro -economic to enforce a cut in the expenditure of the states that account for 60 per cent of the total expenditure of governments in India. As is well known India has one of the weakest stimulus packages and the worst economic contraction in the first quarter of FY 21. The present attitude of the central government has pushed the economy to the brink of the disaster.

 15. If there is no consensus in the GST Council on the above negotiable issues, the legal provisions for Dispute Resolution Mechanism within council should be activated without delay. Interim payments towards Compensation shall continue in the interim period. I request that the above matters should be subjected to a proper discussion in the GST council.

 Further, the long standing demand of the States to appoint a Vice-Chairperson to the GST Council shall be considered and implemented at the earliest.

 With this, I conclude. I take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to the Honb’le Chairperson and all members of the GST Council.

  

Thank You

Sunday, July 26, 2020

Public Health System and Local Governance in Kerala in the Context of COVID-19 Pandemic

(TM Thomas Isaac[1] and Rajeev Sadanandan2)
EPW article Vol. 55, Issue No. 21, 23 May, 2020

 Introduction

 Since the incidence of AIDS, the first pandemic in the post globalisation era, public health experts in Kerala have been conscious of the vulnerability of the state to epidemics in any part of the world. High level of integration with global economy, large non-resident population living in many parts of the world andreliance of the state economy on international tourism contribute to the relatively high vulnerability of the state. Outbreak of Nipah infection in 2018 heightened the threat perception. Since then Kerala has instituted a surveillance mechanism to actively look for emerging pathogens, including disease X, (WHO’s term for a hitherto unknown pathogen) that may strike the state.[1] So when reports emerged from China about an unknown Coronavirus, Kerala went into alert mode. On January 24th Kerala issued guidelines on managing what was then called the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) and later came to be called Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).

 

Since the epicentre of the disease was known, Kerala focussed on persons who returned from China (or other hotspots as they emerged). Since data on persons whose port of origin fell in China (or in other hotspots) was available with the immigration department, it was possible to identify them and track their contacts and quarantine them. The first three positive cases were from the students who had returned from Wuhan. Since all arrivals from Wuhan had been quarantined, further spread was successfully prevented. All the three recovered by February 20th and the state remained free of active cases till March 9th.

 

The dynamics of tracing and tracking changed when new epicentres opened in Europe, Iran and the GCC countries. Many migrant workers living in these countries returned to Kerala. Kerala continued to track the returnees, now much larger in number, who remained in quarantine and their contacts.  Soon positive cases started emerging from this cohort and Kerala emerged as the state with the largest number of Corona Virus Disease (COVID-19) patients in India in India.

 

Many simulations about the likely spread of the pandemic predicted a dire situation for Kerala. An exercise under taken by Protiviti (2020) for Times Network on April 12, estimated that infections would peak in Kerala on 8th May with 72,057 cases with 22,281 severe cases needing intensive care. However the current scenario is that Kerala`s active cases on that day would likely be around two dozen.

 

What helped Kerala was the aggressive strategy of quarantining / placing under observation everyone arriving from outside hot spots and testing all symptomatic persons and, if proved positive, tracing their contacts and placing them under observation. As can be seen from Table 1 the number of new persons placed in institutional or home quarantine began to sharply increase from 495 cases in the first week of March to 84718 cases in the last week of March. The peak was reached on April 4th when a total of 171355 persons were under observation. There after the number steadily declined reflecting the decline in the new persons put under observation during April.

 

Since adequate testing kits were not available the number of persons tested as a proportion of the persons quarantined remained low till the second week of April with the numbers going up as Kerala started community surveillance. Important point to be noted is that almost all the positive cases were from people under observation. So community spread was effectively prevented, even though the strategy of testing only symptomatic persons from among the contacts would have missed asymptomatic contacts who were on observation. Such asymptomatic cases, even if undetected, would not lead to spread for the simple reason that the quarantine period would have neutralized the infectious period. That the number of positive persons remains low, even after the number of tests of persons who were not contacts was scaled up, is a testimonial to the effective prevention strategy of the state. Kerala’s strategy of quarantining all travellers from epicentres cost the state revenue from tourism but has paid off in the number of potential infections averted. 

 

As can be seen from Chart 1 the COVID Curve continued to gain momentum through the month of March. During April the number of new cases testing positive began to steadily decline and recoveries accelerate. As result the Covid Curve lost momentum and Kerala managed to flatten the curve of COVID-19 infections till now. As on May 1st Kerala has the lowest case fatality rate of 0.8 percent and the highest recovery rate at 78.71 percent. The national averages are 3.23% and 26.52 respectively. Finally by 1st May 2020 Kerala`s doubling time (30 days) is almost thrice that of the national average (11 days).

 

Table 1

Number of persons on home quarantine, hospital isolation, tested, positive and discharged in Kerala [30/01/2020 – 02/05/2020]

 

 

Number of persons

Period

Placed in home quarantine

Under Isolation in hospitals

Tested

Positive and put on treatment

Discharged after being cured

30/01 to 15/02

3430

207

415

3

0

15/02 to 29/02

289

30

70

0

3

01/03 to  07/03

433

62

197

0

0

08/03 to 14/03

6863

549

1215

19

0

15/03 to 21/03

46301

452

1819

30

0

22/03 to 28/03

83792

926

2351

130

13

29/03 to 04/04

52218

1007

3677

124

34

05/04 to 11/04

10160

1090

4419

67

93

12/04 to 18/04

534

725

4611

26

114

19/04 to 25/04

2260

755

3586

58

81

26/04 to 02/05

4424

719

8823

42

62

 

(Source: Kerala Health Department)

 

The first major wave has been effectively controlled. There is a high probability that the epidemic could rebound, as has happened in many other countries that achieved similar success early in the epidemic. The large scale return migration expected from latter half of May will pose a major challenge to keeping the epidemic under control. However the factors that helped Kerala control the first wave and defy dooms day predictions has useful lessons for management of health emergencies in low resource settings.

 

Chart 1

The trends in COVID cases of Confirmed, Active, Recovered and Dead

 

 

Source: https://dashboard.kerala.gov.in/

 

This paper will explore the factors that contributed to Kerala’s successful response to COVID-19. We argue that, in addition to a robust health system and demand for health care, social capital of the state, the trust based social contract between the state and people and the active involvement of the community through local governments have played a significant role in Kerala’s success. We also look at a plausible exit strategy for the state from the current situation.

 

Health Care System in Kerala: Demand and Supply

 

The core element of Kerala’s response to COVID-19 is the strong health system of the state.  Good health indicators achieved by Kerala have been attributed to both supply side interventions by successive governments and other agencies and demand side interventions by social movements. Spread of education, particularly among women, also had a salutary impact on consumption of health services. (Jeffrey, 1992)

 

The establishment of the first public dispensary in 1819 by the Maharaja of Thiruvithamkoor (the princely kingdom in the southern region - the main constituent of the present Kerala state) was the first major intervention in the creation of modern public health system. By 1860 Thiruvithamkoor had seven government medical institutions. Being converts to the western system of medicine themselves, the royal family lent their prestige to promoting health services (Nagam Aiya, 1906). This roused interest in western medicine, while the practice of Ayurveda continued to be popular. Education and medical institutions were a part of the evangelical mission of the Christian Missionaries. (Ramankutty, 2000, Baru, 1999)

 

While underlining the importance of the pioneering efforts of royalty and missionaries in Travancore, it must be also understood that there were similar initiatives from the government and the missionaries in British India. Never the less we find that by 1940 while British India had 6.8 institutions per square kilometre and 21.27 beds per lakh population (Government of India, 1948) Thiruvithamkoor had 22.56 institutions and 46.81 beds respectively (Government of Travancore, 1941).

 

Even within Kerala we find a sharp and growing divergence in health and education facilities between Thiruvithamkoor and Kochi in the South and Centre and Malabar region directly under the British rule in the North. The latter was relatively backward in social indicators when compared to the former and the gap widened during the colonial period. The divergent experience in social development between North and South Kerala has been attributed to the difference in the agrarian structures, the former being dominated by Zamindar like land lords and the latter characterized by their relative absence. It facilitated the emergence of a rich farmer class and, later, the development of agro processing industries in the South and emergence of modern classes. This was the back ground of powerful social reform movements in the different castes and communities in the South generating demand for education and health care which were perceived as ladders in upward social mobility (Tharakan, 1984, 2008). Such social intermediation was relatively weak in the North (Kabir and Krishnan, 1992).

 

Malabar region began to close the gap with rest of Kerala after the unification and formation of Kerala. The first Communist government in 1957 initiated substantial investment in health and education facilities in the North. The popular demand for health and education gained momentum with the movement for land reforms and its implementation. The vital contribution of the demand from below for public health has been dramatically revealed in Mencher`s comparison of the primary health care centre (PHC) in Palakkad in North Kerala and that in Thanjavoor in Tamil Nadu. The demand for health care and awareness of entitlements in Kerala were so high that any denial of services in Kerala would be met with protests. (Mencher, 1980) 

 

Owing to popular pressures from below, successive governments in Kerala have invested substantially more in healthcare and education when compared to the rest of India. The share of health expenditure in total government expenditure for all Indian states in the period 1960 to 1970 was 8.13% while it was 10.43% for Kerala.  However the fiscal crisis of the state government from the 1970s forced cutting back the social expenditure raising questions regarding limits to Kerala Model. (George, 1993)  The health expenditure ratio declined over time shrinking to 7.69% in 1985-86, 6.81% in 1995-96, 5.5% in 1999-00 and 4.5% in 2004-05[2]. When government cut back investments in health, the private sector stepped in to meet the demand supply gap. (Sadanandan, 2001)

 

From the low in 2004-05 the importance of health in Kerala’s budget began to creep up during 2006 – 2011 period touching 5.1% in 2010-11 which was maintained till 2015-16. The government that came to power in 2016 launched the Aardram mission with objective of transforming primary health care and increasing the percentage of population using government hospitals. Under the mission more than 5289 posts of hospital workers were added. In addition to doubling plan investment from Rs 629 crores in 2014-15 to Rs 1419 Crores in 2018-19[3] through budgetary resources, Rs 2266 Crore raised through a special purpose vehicle (Kerala Infrastructure Investment Fund Board) was committed to improving hospital infrastructure and equipment (Government of Kerala, 2020). Results have already become evident: the percentage of persons using government facilities went up from 34% in the 71st round of NSSO [2014] to 48% in the 75th round (2017-18). (NSSO, 2015, 2019)

 

Response of the Health Department to COVID-19.

 

South East Asian countries, like Taiwan, which had very close links to China and were expected to have an epidemic similar to the Chinese one, benefited from their experience of having managed the SARS epidemic which had a similar route of spread as COVID-19[4]. The experience of managing two episodes of Nipah gave Kerala a comparable advantage. Health workers were trained to trace, track and transport persons with symptoms safely, isolation beds and protocols for providing supportive care were in place and people were familiar with the importance of observing house quarantine. Above all people had lived through the terror of an unknown pathogen and never underestimated the threat of the new virus. Kerala had the experience of having managed a comparable threat and had the confidence that they could handle this too.

 

From January 2020 Kerala started preparing systematically to handle a possible outbreak. The standard operating procedures issued by the state covered such areas as infection prevention and control for ambulances, management of bio medical waste, handling spill of body fluids, disinfection and sterilisation, hand washing, management of dead bodies, use of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) and sample collection and transportation. A set of consolidated guidelines covering testing, quarantine, hospital admissions, treatment and discharge was also issued and revised often to accommodate changed perceptions and strategies. The guidelines were accompanied by training modules.

 

The additional investments in the health sector and the preparedness contributed to high morale of the health workers which is indeed a sharp contrast to the sense of helplessness and unrest among health workers in many of even the elite medical centres in the country. From the beginning health minister of Kerala, who had led the Nipah response from the front, provided strong and visible leadership to the health department. The level of confidence health system displayed in dealing with the epidemic and the trust the people of Kerala had in the government health system rose from their competence demonstrated in handling the Nipah crisis and the aftermath of two floods.

 

Social Foundation of the COVID-19 Response

 

While the health system remains the most significant contributor to Kerala’s health status, demand side factors such as female literacy, empowerment of dalits and other socially disadvantaged groups other than tribals, high levels of political mobilisation, active involvement of panchayats and municipalities, emergence of civil society groups, high salience of health issues in political discourse and an active media have been important ingredients in ensuring that health remained important to the people and government of the state. It has also ensured that epidemic prevention efforts are supported by other actors in Kerala society.

 

The state government also tries to actively tap the synergies springing from coordinated action with the above social actors and tap the abundant social capital in the state. The high density of associational relations like non-government organisations, religious groups, trade unions, libraries, clubs, and professional associations who get involved in social issues have been identified as the source of social capital (Heller, 1996). It has also been linked to reduction of poverty in the state (Morris, 1998). Every political party has to demonstrate their involvement of working with the people to remain relevant and their units involve in activities related to rural poverty, women empowerment and palliative care. These initiatives exist independent of government and complement government’s efforts. They were on the scene during the Nipah crisis and floods and now have mobilised themselves to support the COVID response too.

 

Transparency and Trust in Government

 

Management of health emergencies require active collaboration by the population, who may be required to make unpleasant sacrifices. To achieve such collaboration people must have trust in their government (Scot et al, 2016).  Traditionally trust in government has been high in Kerala. This was augmented by the success in managing many crises in recent years. So messaging on social distancing and self-quarantine were viewed seriously by the people who also exercised peer pressure on errant persons.

 

During times of crisis people value reliable information even if it is bad. Willingness of government to share information with the people constantly increases transparency and generates trust. The Chief Minister of Kerala, after reviewing the data and discussing policy decisions, share the important information with the people every day through a live press conference which has been the most watched event in recent days in Kerala. Constant information, not all of them good, is shared through the mainstream and social media. Government has borne the entire cost of testing and treating COVID-19 in the state.

 

These actions have earned for government the trust of the people, which creates the environment for people to co-operate with government even if the task is difficult. They believe that their government is transparent sharing truthful information, will take care of them should they fall sick and support them if they need it. In return they are prepared to subject themselves to restrictions government has imposed to control the epidemic. It is generally felt that the government has been successful so far. The real test of this trust will come if and when the situation becomes serious and the state’s capacities are in danger of being overwhelmed.

 

Decentralised Participatory Planning

 

The leadership provided at the ground level by local government institutions, who have been empowered with funds, functions and functionaries, played a major role in coordinating activities in other sectors with health interventions and also supporting health initiatives at the level. The year 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of the People’s Plan Campaign for democratic decentralisation that has placed Kerala as the fore runner in decentralisation (Thomas Isaac and Franke, 2000). In addition to investing their own resources in augmenting human resources, drugs and equipment and launching into areas that were ignored by the formal health system such as palliative care and rehabilitation, local governments have been active on prevention and control of infectious diseases and disaster management. Having managed the periodic vector and water borne diseases every year and health consequences of floods in two successive years had prepared them to manage the current health emergency.

 

Disaster Management has been and will continue to be a centralised hierarchical process. But the experience in Kerala demonstrates the importance of local level planning, mobilisation and intervention within the larger macro framework, which ensures equity and access in mitigation efforts. A formal recognition of this new responsibility came with the government order empowering the local governments as the agency to prepare local level disaster management plan. The panchayat/municipal level disaster management reports analyse recent natural disasters particularly floods, and then propose medium term mitigation projects which would be taken up by the local governments or proposed to the higher tiers of government. They would also include an immediate action for response in case such a disaster recurs. The state government has also been organising a volunteer force, with at least one volunteer for 100 people, to be coordinated by the local governments during disasters. Management of COVID-19 fitted in this framework for disaster management of panchayats and municipalities.

 

Local Governments and Health

 

People`s Planning was launched with a declaration to transfer 30-35 % of state plan funds as untied funds to local governments. Health has been a major beneficiary of this financial devolution. Indeed, an important rationale of the large transfer was to improve the quality of government services in education and health. It was expected that the local level plans would reflect people’s priorities more effectively, which in Kerala would definitely benefit the health sector. During the initial years results were mixed. The overall investment in state and local plans for health doubled from 2.2 to 4.5 per cent (Thomas Isaac and Franke, 2000).

 

The efforts were stymied by the reluctance of the major power holders in the health sector, doctors, to engage with local governments. They were also reluctant to shoulder additional duties involved in implementing local health projects, particularly, construction activities. Over time this attitude changed and medical personnel began to be actively involved in the local planning process. They realised that it was much easier to get their priorities accepted by the local elected representatives than the bureaucratic hierarchy. There has been a large body of literature that have attempted to evaluate the impact of decentralization on health care. Though there is always scope for improvement the studies, by and large, support the thesis of positive impact (Elamon et al2004, Chathukulam 2016, Azeez 2015, John and Jacob 2016, Chandran and Pankaj 2014, Abdul Azeez 2015).

 

The involvement of the local governments in health care at the primary level has witnessed the dramatic improvement after the launch of Aadram Mission. Local governments contribute to improvement and maintenance of the buildings of primary health centres and sub centres, purchase of drugs and medical equipment, employ doctors, nurses and paramedical staff on contract and supplement the honorarium of ASHA (Accredited Social Health Activist) workers. They also provide the bridge between health department and civil society organisations such as palliative organisations, voluntary food programs and kudumbasree health volunteers. They have an important role in geriatric care, support for differently abled and finance the special schools for children with cognitive disabilities. They are in charge of prevention of vector and waterborne infectious diseases. Given the high level of involvement of local governments in health and related sectors it was only natural that they play an important role in the fight against COVID-19.

 

Local Governments and the Pandemic

 

On 20th March 2020 the involvement of local government was formalised through a government order. It listed generation of awareness about COVID-19 and Break the Chain movement, sanitation, support for persons in isolation, ensuring availability of essential items and documentation of prevention efforts including inventorying medical and other resources and number of persons who needed additional support as responsibility of local governments. It also listed the functions of different levels and office bearers.

 

Beyond the above formal assignments, what brought out the strength of the local bodies, were the community kitchens to provide food to whoever needed it, which sprung up in less than three days across the state. They were set up wherever they could be: closed down hotels, school kitchens, marriage halls. Most of the provisions needed- rice, pulses, condiments, vegetables and even meat and fish - were mobilised through donations. Apart from one or two cooks every kitchen was run by a large number of volunteers as kitchen helpers, parcel makers and distributers. At its height the community kitchens were serving more than five lakh meals per day. For persons who could not come to the kitchens food was delivered at home.

 

It was possible to scale up the operation so effectively in such a short time because of Kudumbasree, a network of women’s neighbourhood groups (Kannan et al, 2017). They have a strong tradition of involvement in poverty alleviation programmes. They were already operating 946 catering units and 1479 café units. There were also palliative care groups that provided food free to the doorstep of destitute bed ridden persons. The local governments drew on their experience for setting up their community kitchens. As the economy exits from the lock down, the community kitchens will also withdraw but most of them would be taken forward as budget hotels by Kudumbasree women providing meals at Rs. 20 and even free to the needy.

 

Yet another responsibility of the local government has been monitoring the camps of migrant workers and ensuring their food and medical treatment. Kerala accounted for 65 percent of the 23567 camps and 47 percent of the 6.5 lakhs migrant workers sheltered in them in India[5]. The local government representatives and officials visit the camps, check sanitation, provide food kits in some locations and, in some cases, even made available free mobile chargers and games like chess and caroms to keep them engaged. An interesting good practice is that of Uralunkal Labour Contract Cooperative Society, the largest construction cooperative in India with nearly 3000 workers, majority of whom are migrant workers. The migrant workers are encouraged to take membership in the society so that they get full benefit of a member (Thomas Isaac and Williams, 2017). When the crisis came, those workers who wanted to return home were sent back at the expense of the Cooperative itself in special buses. While the situation of the migrant workers is far from satisfactory the local governments tried to make them as bearable as possible.

 

In addition to health and local self-government departments, similar guidelines were also issued by other departments such as police, disaster management, education and a few other departments on how to support COVID-19 prevention efforts. Such guidelines would not produce the desired results if their implementation was not coordinated and monitored. Performance monitoring and coordination of the functioning of different departments are meticulously reviewed by the Chief Minister every day and results of the analysis shared with the people of Kerala.

 

Exit Strategy

 

Kerala is now preparing an exit strategy from complete lock down. An important challenge would be to track and test and where needed quarantine or treat the expected 5 lakh migrant Malayalees who would be returning from gulf and other foreign countries and also from other states in India. Local governments have been involved in identifying all the potential return migrants in their area and are collaborating with Public Works Department to find hotels, hostels, unoccupied flats and large houses to quarantine them. Already accommodation has been identified for 2.5 lakh persons. All the returnees have to be quarantined and tested    and those found positive would be isolated and treated. There would be also option for the return migrants to use hotel accommodation for quarantine on payment.

 

The second component of the exit strategy is reverse quarantine. All persons above 65 and those suffering from chronic diseases, who are at higher risk of adverse consequences if infected, will have to stay indoors and, if necessary, in the isolation rooms in the houses. For Kerala this will be a daunting task with 13.5 percent of population above the age of 65 and high incidence of diabetics and hypertension. Quarantining more than 40 lakh people in the house would require big data analytics to draw up regional strategies. Equally important are the local level planning to provide medicine, counselling and if necessary, free food to those who are quarantined. Personal hygiene, habits of hand washing and use of masks will have to be strengthened. Some of the local governments like Aryad Block Panchayat and constituent Gram Panchayats are already experimenting with reverse quarantining. Using digitised health data of all the citizens, telemedicine, free food, medicine and counselling to the needy, their effort is to ensure that the aged and other vulnerable sections stay home safe.

 

Third component of the exit strategy would be carefully opening up livelihood activities. The first to open up was agriculture and allied sectors and cottage and small scale industry. These sectors are largely with in the domain of the local governments. Cultivation of paddy and mixed crops in the coconut homesteads in the state have been declining. Perhaps COVID-19 crisis may provide an opportunity to reverse the trend. Even during the lock down period vegetable cultivation was being promoted and is going to be taken up on a campaign mode. Peoples’ Plan Campaign had succeeded in establishing large number of aggregation models of participatory small scale vegetable cultivation. The Agriculture Department is in the process of drawing up a comprehensive package for agrarian revival in collaboration with the local governments. The reopening the traditional industries will be paralleled with program for promoting new enterprises.   The budget for 2020-21 had provided for generating five new jobs in non-agriculture sector for every 1000 persons in every local government area.

 

The MGNREGS activities constitute an important component of the exit strategy. They would be front loaded to the maximum extent to provide employment and income to the poor. It has been decided that the focus of the program will be on de-silting and reconstructing about half the 80000 km canal network in Kerala, which would help to mitigate the possible flood during monsoon and help irrigation in summer. The gram panchayaths are the sole agency for the implementation of the MGNREGS works in Kerala and a convergence approach with the local plan is being adopted.

 

Unlocking the economy is a much larger exercise than local agriculture and industry programmes. It would require concerted action from the Central and State Governments. The state has already drawn up certain priority sectors such as pharmaceuticals and medical devices industries, bio technology and information technology sectors, value adding agro processing industries and tourism. The new brand image the state has gained as safe and resilient region would be utilized to attract investment to these sectors. With the expected heavy return migration, special efforts would also have to be made for the rehabilitation and reintegration of migrants. Large scale infrastructure investment from resources mobilized through special purpose vehicles like Kerala Infrastructure Investment Fund Board (KIIFB) will also be playing a major role in the exit strategy.

 

Fiscal Crisis

 

The State Government has already appointed two committees, one by Planning Board and the other by Gulati Institute of Finance and Taxation to study the impact of COVID pandemic on the economy and state finances respectively. It is not our intention to discuss these ongoing exercises. Special packages have to be prepared for each of the industrial sectors. For the MSME sector as well as the farm sector, the moratorium period should be extended to one year with an interest waiver and the existing loans restructured to provide additional working capital. While the Central Government has been generous with the tax concessions for the corporates it has been extremely miserly towards the MSME sector. The conditions imposed for accessing central governments support for PF and ESI concessions are too unrealistic for most industrial units in Kerala to take advantage of.

 

The biggest handicap of the state government has been the unprecedented fiscal crisis that the state government is facing. The states own revenue have shrunk to one tenth of the normal and overall revenues including the central devolution is insufficient to even pay the monthly salary. This situation has not deterred the state government from rolling out a 20,000 crore Covid package, half of which is essentially direct income transfer to the people under lockdown conditions. This has been largely financed by front loading the borrowings, the co-operatives and kudumbasree micro finance.

 

At present we have a strange situation in the country when the central government is following a moderately expansionary fiscal stance while it is forcing states to cut expenditure in times of the pandemic crisis. What one does is neutralised by the other. It is very important that the state governments are also taken into confidence and provided with additional fiscal space by raising the fiscal deficit ceiling to five percent, full payment of the GST Compensation and a special COVID pandemic grant to neutralise the decline in central devolution.

 

Conclusion

 

The STEPP framework, developed by the United Nations to deal with the Ebola outbreak[6], - Stop the outbreak, Treat the infected, Ensure essential services, Preserve stability and Prevent further outbreaks - has become a standard reference norm for health emergencies. Being a health emergency, health systems will be the centre of the response. In STEPP only treatment is the exclusive domain of health department. A comprehensive response will need to go beyond health systems and mobilise the entire society. A large-scale, coordinated humanitarian, social, public health, and medical response will be needed (Farrar and Piot, 2014). Kerala’s COVID-19 response has passed this test. While the exemplary leadership at state level in addressing the crisis has been widely noted our discussion also highlighted the importance of the social capital and the active involvement of the people through local governments that played a significant role in Kerala’s success.

 

The challenge is not over yet. We do not know the prevalence of the virus in the community which may lead to new clusters developing silently. The large number of expatriates and from other places in India who are set to come back is yet another major challenge Kerala is gearing up to meet and may adversely impact the disease situation. Till a proper vaccine is discovered or herd immunity develops people will have to learn to live with the Virus.  However Kerala has demonstrated the resilience to handle all but the worst case scenario and perhaps avoid such an eventuality.

 

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19.    Raman Kutty. V: ‘Historical analysis of the development of health care facilities in Kerala State, India”, Health Policy and Planning 15 (1): 103-109. (2000).

20.    Sadanandan, R: ‘Government Health Services in Kerala: Who Benefits?Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 32, pp. 3071-3077, (2001).

21.    Scott, V, Crawford-Browne S, and Sanders, D (2016):  ‘Critiquing the response to the Ebola epidemic through a Primary Health Care Approach’,   BMC Public Health 16:410 DOI 10.1186/s12889-016-3071-4.

22.    State Planning Board (2019): ‘Economic Review 2018’, Thiruvananthapuram.

23.    Tharakan, M (2008), ‘When the Kerala Model of Development is Histroricised: A Chronological Perspective’, Working Paper No. 19, Centre for Socio-economic & Environmental. Studies, Kochi

24.    Tharakan, M: ‘Socio-Economic Factors in Educational Development: Case of Nineteenth Century Travancore’, Economic and Political Weekly, (1984) Vol 19, No. 45.

25.    Tharakan, M:A Note on Sree Narayana Guru Teachings and Health in Rural Kerala,’ Journal, Review of Agrarian Studies, (2018)Vol. 8(1).

26.    Thomas Isaac T.M, Michelle W (2017):, ‘Of Building Alternatives: The Story of India`s Oldest Construction Worker`s Cooperative’, Left Word, New Delhi.

27.    Thomas Isaac T.M, Franke RW (2000):  ‘Local Democracy and Development: People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning in Kerala’. Left Word, New Delhi.

 



[1] Dr. T.M Thomas Isaac is the Finance Minister of Kerala and 2 Rajeev Sadanandan is Former Health Secretary of Kerala and currently CEO, Health Systems Transformation Platform, New Delhi. Views are personal.



[2] Reserve Bank of India: ‘Reserve Bank of India Bulletin’, Various issues.

[3] Economic Review 2018: [http://spb.kerala.gov.in/ER2018/index.php] Downloaded on 28 April 2020

[4]See for instance: How has Taiwan kept its coronavirus infection rate so low? https://www.dw.com/en/taiwan-coronavirus/a-52724523 Downloaded on  28 April 2020

[5] Coronavirus Lockdown: Kerala Has 69% Of India’s Government-Run Relief Camps For Migrant Workers  https://www.bloombergquint.com/coronavirus-outbreak/coronavirus-lockdown-kerala-has-69-of-indias-government-run-relief-camps-for-migrant-workers Downloaded on  30 April 2020


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